TOYOTA

Toyota Motor North America, Inc.

Vehicle Safety & Compliance
Liaison Office
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Plano, TX 75024

December 11, 2019

DEFECT INFORMATION REPORT

1. Vehicle Manufacturer Name:

Toyota Motor Corporation ["TMC"]
1, Toyota-cho, Toyota-city,
Aichi, 471-8571, Japan

Affiliated U.S. Sales Company:

Toyota Motor North America, Inc. ["TMNA"]
6565 Headquarters Drive, Plano, TX 75024

Manufacturer of Rear Seat Belt Assembly

Joyson Safety Systems
2-3-14 Higashishinagawa, Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo
Phone: +81-3-6455-8402

Country of Origin: JAPAN

2. Identification of Involved Vehicles and Affected Components:

Based on production records, we have determined the involved vehicle population as in the table below.

Make/Car Line	Model Year	Manufacturer	Production Period
Toyota/C-HR	2019-2020	TMC	August 26, 2019 through October 10, 2019
Toyota/Corolla, Corolla Hybrid	2020	TMC	August 22, 2019 through September 6, 2019

Applicability	Part Number	Part Name	Component Description
MY2019-2020 Toyota C-HR	73350-10140-C0	Belt Assy, RR Seat, Outer CTR	Rear Center Seat Belt
MY2020 Toyota Corolla, Corolla Hybrid	73360-12C10-C0	Belt Assy, RR Seat, Outer RH	Rear Right Seat Belt
	73350-12370-C1	Belt Assy, RR Seat, Outer CTR	Rear Center Seat Belt
	73370-12720-C0	Belt Assy, RR Seat, Outer LH	Rear Left Seat Belt

Note: (1) Although the involved vehicles are within the above production period range, not all vehicles in this range were sold in the U.S.

(2) This issue only affects the vehicles equipped with rear seat belt assembly(s) which may have been manufactured under the specific conditions described in this report. Other Toyota or Lexus vehicles sold in the U.S. are not equipped with those rear seat belt assembly(s).

3. Total Number of Vehicles Potentially Involved:

Toyota C-HR : 3,211
Toyota Corolla : 4,595
Toyota Corolla Hybrid : 1,662
Total : 9,468

4. Percentage of Vehicles Estimated to Actually Contain the Defect:

Approximately 4%
Based on part production testing, Toyota estimates that approximately 4% of the seat belt assemblies have the potential for the webbing sensor locking mechanism to be inoperative, which could lead to the unreasonable risk to safety described below.

5. Description of Problem:

The subject vehicles are equipped with rear seat belt assemblies with a dual mode locking mechanism. It will lock the seat belt webbing based on vehicle deceleration (G-sensor) and also lock the seat belt webbing if it is pulled out quickly (webbing sensor). During a specific production period, a supplier used an improper adjustment for the equipment used to assemble a certain spring which is used in the webbing sensor locking mechanism. As a result, there is a possibility that the spring could be installed at an incorrect position. In this condition, the spring could interfere with another component of the webbing sensor locking mechanism, which potentially causes the mechanism not to lock as designed (the

G-sensor is not affected and operates properly). In certain types of severe crashes, such as those involving multiple impacts, if the seat belt G-sensor is damaged in an initial impact, the webbing sensor may not lock as designed in subsequent impacts. This can cause an occupant to not be restrained properly in certain crashes, increasing the risk of injury.

6. Chronology of Principal Events:

August, 2019 – September, 2019

On August 28, 2019, during a standard inspection process at a vehicle assembly plant, a plant team member found that the pull-out speed sensor (webbing sensor) locking mechanism for a rear seat belt did not activate. This part was sent to the supplier for investigation. Based on this supplier investigation, it was observed that the recovered part had an inoperative locking mechanism due to pawl spring interference with another component of the locking mechanism, in addition to incorrect pawl spring position and pawl spring deformation. However, it was unclear at this time what the relationships were between these observed conditions.

The supplier's review of the production history identified several other recently produced assemblies which also had locking mechanisms that did not activate due to pawl spring interference. The compression pin used to assemble the pawl spring in these parts was inspected, and it was found that the angle of the compression pin was not correct.

On August 29, the angle of the compression pin was adjusted to the proper position, and an inspection which captured an image of the pawl spring in its assembled condition was added to the production process to help verify that the pawl spring was assembled in the correct position.

Inspections were conducted on inventory parts at the vehicle assembly plants that were produced during the same part assembly production period as the recovered part to identify if other parts from this period could have the same condition. It was found that some of these inventory parts were also assembled with the pawl spring installed in an incorrect position.

Production process history was further reviewed, and it was found that the equipment used to install the pawl spring was adjusted on August 19, 2019. It was presumed that the angle of compression pin was shifted during this adjustment of the equipment.

October, 2019 – November. 2019

Testing was conducted with the same equipment conditions that existed after the adjustment on August 19, 2019. Based on this testing, it was determined that the pawl spring may not be assembled in the correct position, similar to the condition of the recovered part when manufactured using these equipment conditions.

Further testing was conducted to confirm if an incorrectly installed pawl spring would be deformed when the locking mechanism is activated. It was confirmed that, when the webbing

sensor locking mechanism is activated, the pawl spring could be deformed as it expanded and contracted. Due to amount of deformation experienced during the testing, the pawl spring may interfere with another component of locking mechanism, potentially causing the webbing sensor locking mechanism to not activate.

December 5, 2019

Based on the above investigation, Toyota decided to conduct a voluntary safety recall campaign on the subject vehicles.

As of December 3, 2019, based on a diligent review of records, Toyota's best engineering judgment is that there are no Toyota Field Technical Reports or warranty claims that have been received from U.S. sources that relate to this condition and which were considered in the decision to submit this report.

7. Description of Corrective Repair Action:

All known owners of the affected Toyota vehicles will be notified to return their vehicles to a Toyota dealer. The dealers will inspect the production date of the subject rear seat belt assemblies and replace any affected seat belt assembly with a new one that was not produced under the aforementioned conditions.

Reimbursement Plan for pre-notification remedies

As the owner notifications will be sent well within the active period of the Toyota New Vehicle Limited Warranty, all involved vehicle owners for this recall would have been provided a repair at no cost under Toyota's Warranty.

8. Recall Schedule:

Notifications to owners of the affected vehicles will occur by early February, 2020. A copy of the draft owner notification will be submitted as soon as it is available.

9. Distributor/Dealer Notification Schedule:

Notifications to distributors/dealers were sent on December 10, 2019. Copies of dealer communications will be submitted as they are issued.

10. Manufacturer's Campaign Number:

[Interim / Remedy] 19TB22 / 19TA22